Shaping policy for development
Unblocking results: using aid to address governance constraints in public service delivery

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Outline of the presentation

- Governance constraints and their existence
- Activities
- Enabling factors
- What does this mean?
## Typical governance constraints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of governance constraint</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Common effects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy and institutional incoherence</td>
<td>Unclear and duplicated mandates. Policy and resource frameworks in conflict.</td>
<td>Incentives for staff to either refrain from implementing policies, or simultaneously pursue several conflicting policies at once.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor top-down performance disciplines and bottom-up accountability mechanisms</td>
<td>Weak top-down and bottom-up accountability mechanisms.</td>
<td>Rules not developed or enforced, instructions are not followed and functions are not carried out.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limited scope for problem-solving and local collective action solutions</td>
<td>Groups are not acting together to produce solutions that are appropriate and in the collective interest.</td>
<td>Result in the under or over-utilisation of services, and are associated with a longstanding disrepair of shared goods.</td>
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Collected examples of aid packages that have addressed governance constraints

Examined 4 aid packages in Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Uganda – very diverse
How were the constraints addressed?

Activities

Enabling factors
What type of aid-funded activities helped?

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Governance Constraints</th>
<th>Activities</th>
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</table>
| Policy and institutional incoherence    | • Support government prioritisation processes, with particular focus on addressing specific implementation gaps  
• Target and resolve conflicting mandates which impinge on implementation |
| Poor performance disciplines            | • Top-down: support the combination of incentives and information, providing managers with more information with which to hold their subordinate department or individuals to account  
• Bottom-up: facilitate stakeholders to recognise their collective power to effect change and exercise their oversight responsibilities in a practical way |
| Limited scope for problem solving and local CA | • Act as coaches and brokers and use ‘outsider status’ to encourage stakeholders to meet, discuss and resolve common problems |
What enabling factors helped?

- Identifying and seizing windows of opportunity
- Focusing on reforms with tangible political payoffs
- Building on what exists to implement legal mandates
- Moving beyond reliance on policy dialogue
- Facilitating problem-solving and local collective action
- Adaptation by learning
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENABLING FACTOR</th>
<th>CURRENT PRACTICE (STYLISED)</th>
<th>PROPOSED PRACTICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windows of opportunity</td>
<td>Country strategies based on needs assessments</td>
<td>Weigh need against opportunity to affect change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tangible political payoffs</td>
<td>Reluctance to have projects associated with political platforms/agendas</td>
<td>Accept that aid is inherently political and work with the political incentive structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building on what’s there</td>
<td>Tendency to want to start afresh with a revised legal, policy or regulatory framework</td>
<td>Get existing framework implemented, however imperfectly, and then adjust</td>
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<td>Moving beyond policy advice</td>
<td>TA engaged to advise on the content of policies</td>
<td>TA engaged to support implementation of policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acting as facilitators</td>
<td>External agents provide sound technocratic advice for govts to ‘take or leave’</td>
<td>External agents help to facilitate and mediate a local dialogue about problems and solutions</td>
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<td>Adaptive and responsive to lessons learnt</td>
<td>Pre-defined logical frameworks that lock donors and implementers into a set of activities</td>
<td>Flexible frameworks that judge performance on the basis of a sensible effort, rather than pre-defined targets</td>
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</table>
Research objectives:

- **Validate the research findings**, with a larger and more diverse set of case studies
- **Explore implications for development partner practices**
- **Identify the challenges** to more politically-astute aid practices, and solutions to these
Thank you

If you are interesting in engaging with this initiative please contact:

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